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Abstract
Recent advancements in the brain sciences have enabled researchers to determine, with
increasing accuracy, patterns and locations of neural activation associated with various
psychological functions. These techniques have revived a longstanding debate regard-
ing the relation between the mind and the brain: while many authors now claim that
neuroscientific data can be used to advance our theories of higher cognition, others
defend the so-called ‘autonomy’ of psychology. Settling this significant question re-
quires understanding the nature of the bridge laws used at the psycho-neural interface.
While these laws have been the topic of extensive discussion, such debates have mostly
focused on a particular type of link: reductive laws. Reductive laws are problematic:
they face notorious philosophical objections and they are too scarce to substantiate
current research at the interface of psychology and neuroscience. The aim of this ar-
ticle is to provide a systematic analysis of a different kind of bridge laws—associative
laws—which play a central, albeit often overlooked, role in scientific practice.
1 Introduction
In a now classic paper, Jerry Fodor (1974, p. 97) questioned the evidence
for theoretical reductionism by noting that “the development of science has
witnessed the proliferation of specialized disciplines at least as often as it has
witnessed their reduction to physics, so the widespread enthusiasm for reduction
can hardly be a mere induction over its past successes.” Four decades later,
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†We are grateful to Bruce Pennington and Kateri McRae for constructive comments on
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Fodor’s assessment remains accurate; indeed, it has been reinforced. Rather
than being progressively reduced to physics, the special sciences have sprawled
into a number of burgeoning subfields. Yet, at the same time, we have also
witnessed the rise of interdisciplinary studies. If, as Fodor holds, the special
sciences are relatively ‘autonomous,’ what explains the recent proliferation of
fields such as neurolinguistics, moral psychology, and neuroeconomics?
The relation between different scientific fields has been extensively debated
in philosophy and the particular case of psychology and neuroscience has gath-
ered enormous attention. As reported in Bourget and Chalmers (2013), the
dominant position is now non-reductive physicalism—the thesis that, although
mental states are realized by brain states, mental kinds cannot, in general, be
reduced to neural kinds. As we shall discuss below, this position fails to address
an important issue, namely, why studying the brain can inform our understand-
ing of the mind. The failure to provide an answer to this question is especially
troublesome given the current trend in cognitive neuroscience, where advance-
ments in neuroimaging have begun to affect theories of higher cognition, such as
language processing and decision making (Gazzaniga 2009; Mather et al. 2013;
Glimcher and Fehr 2014). If theorists are right that the mapping of mental kinds
onto neural kinds is too problematic to substantiate any meaningful interaction
at this interface, is neuroscience simply promising something that cannot be
achieved? Or does the constant use of neural data in fields such as neurolin-
guistics and neuroeconomics, show that philosophical critique misunderstands
the relation between cognitive and neural levels?
In this article, we argue that the tension between meta-theory and scien-
tific practice stems from the failure to distinguish between different types of
bridge laws, that is, principles that link kinds across domains. On the one
hand, theorists have generally been concerned with reductive laws, which are
indeed problematic. On the other hand, bridge laws currently employed in cog-
nitive neuroscience are not reductive; they are associative statements that are
categorically distinct from the contingent type-identities typically employed in
derivational reduction and other more recent reductive approaches. The aim
of this essay is to provide an account of associative bridge laws. Despite their
widespread use in neuropsychology, these links have never been systematically
discussed. We begin by introducing the role of type-identities in traditional
models of derivational reduction and rehearse some well-known problems (§2).
Next, we illustrate how bridge laws are employed in neuroscientific studies of
higher-cognition (§3) and elucidate the main differences between reductive and
associative bridge laws (§4). We conclude by presenting some implications of
our analysis for extant debates in the philosophy of mind and science (§5).
2 Bridge Laws in Theory Reduction
Philosophers of science originally became interested in bridge laws because of
their central role in theory reduction. In what became a locus classicus, Nagel
(1961) characterized reduction as a deductive derivation of the laws of a reduced
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theory S from the laws of a reducing theory P . Such derivation requires that
the natural kinds of S be expressed in terms of the natural kinds of P .1 For
instance, suppose that we want to show that law LS : S1x → S2x, expressed
in the language of theory S, can be reduced to (that is, derived from) law
LP : P1x → P2x, expressed in the language of theory P .2 What we need is a
series of bridge laws that translate the relevant S-predicates into P -predicates:
(B1) S1x↔ P1x
(B2) S2x↔ P2x
How should the ‘↔’ connective be interpreted in these reductive bridge laws?
Fodor (1974) makes a number of important points. First,↔ must be transitive:
if kind S1 is reduced to T1, and in turn, T1 is reduced to P1, then S1 is thereby
reduced to P1. Second, ↔ cannot be read as ‘causes,’ for causal relations tend
to be asymmetric—causes bring about their effects, but effects generally do
not bring about their causes—whereas bridge laws tend to be symmetric: if an
S1-event is a P1-event, then a P1-event is also an S1-event. Given these two
features, bridge laws are most naturally interpreted as expressing contingent
event identities. Thus understood, B1 can be read as stating that S1 is type-
identical to P1. As Fodor notes, reductive bridge laws express a stronger position
than token physicalism, the view that all events that fall under the laws of some
special science are physical events. Statements such as B1 and B2 presuppose
type physicalism, according to which every kind that figures in the laws of a
science is type-identical to a physical kind.3
The well-known problem with type-physicalism is that natural kinds seldom
correspond neatly across levels. Although one could make a case that heat is re-
ducible to mean molecular kinetic energy, or action-potentials to nerve impulses,
the reigning consensus in philosophy of science is that there are too few contin-
gent event identities to make derivational reduction a plausible inter-theoretic
model (Horst 2007). In most cases, there seem to be no physical, chemical, or
macromolecular kinds that correspond to biological, psychological or economic
kinds in the manner required by the reductionist scheme. This, simply put,
is the multiple-realizability argument against the classical model of derivational
reduction (Putnam 1967; Fodor 1974). The basic idea is that instead of laws
such as B1 and B2, what we usually find are linking laws such as B3, which
capture the instantiation of higher-level kinds in a variety of lower-level states:
(B3) S1x↔ P1x ∨ . . . ∨ Pnx
1In what follows we shall not enter the longstanding metaphysical debate on the notion of
natural kind. For present purposes, we treat natural kinds as predicates that fall under the
laws or generalizations of a (branch of) science (Fodor 1974).
2For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the languages of the two theories do not overlap,
i.e., the natural kinds of S do not belong to P , and vice versa.
3To be clear, our focus here is not on physicalism per se; the relevant claim is whether the
kinds of one science can be reduced to the kinds of another more ‘fundamental’ science, not
necessarily to physics.
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The demise of derivational reduction had a deep and lasting effect on the con-
ceptualization of the psycho-neural interface. Despite its problems, the Nagelian
model provided a clear account of how neural data could, at least in principle,
inform theories of higher cognition. To illustrate, suppose we want to know
whether some psychological kind C is engaged in task T , as we often do when
testing competing cognitive-level hypotheses. If we had a bridge law which
maps C onto a neural kind N , we could infer the presence (or absence) of C in
T from neural evidence of the presence (or absence) of N . Hence, the reductive
model suggests a specific goal for cognitive neuropsychology, namely, to look for
neural-level implementations of psychological processes. The failure of Nagelian
reduction, however, implies that this account of the psycho-neural interface is
misguided or, at best, overly simplistic.
In response to the multiple-realizability argument, philosophers pursued two
alternative routes. Some reacted by developing reductive accounts that, al-
legedly, do not require problematic bridge laws (Hooker 1981; Bickle 1998; Kim
1999, 2005). However, it has been persuasively argued that any form of bona
fide reductionism requires some kind of bridge laws (Marras 2002; Fazekas 2009).
Following a different path, many philosophers of mind embraced an antireduc-
tionist or functionalist approach, according to which mental states are individ-
uated by their causal roles, independently of their physical realization (Fodor
1974, 1997). While this move besets the problems raised by multiple realizabil-
ity, it fails to explain how, if cognitive kinds are not type-identical to neural
kinds, neural data can bear on the study of cognition.
Part of the problem with the extant debate, we surmise, is that reductionists
and antireductionists alike share an overly restrictive view of the psycho-neural
interface. Researchers belonging to both camps often talk as if the only potential
contributions of neuroscience to psychology are:
(i) To establish correlations between cognitive- and neural-level events, i.e., to
find the brain locations where particular mental functions are computed.
(ii) To discover the neural-level mechanisms that compute cognitive processes,
i.e., to establish how the brain actually computes specific mental functions.
Let us begin by focusing on (ii), the more substantial and ambitious en-
deavor. Reductionists tend to stress the remarkable successes in discovering
neural mechanisms of sensory systems, such as early vision, pain, taste, and
other basic sensations (Bickle 2003; Kim 2006). Antireductionists, in contrast,
rightly emphasize that comparable achievements cannot be claimed for language
processing, decision making, and other functions of higher cognition. It is un-
surprising, then, that many researchers deem the pursuit of project (ii) hopeless
(Fodor 1999) or, at best, drastically premature (Gallistel 2009; Coltheart 2013),
at least when applied to central cognitive systems. On the traditional view of
the interface based on (i) and (ii) this skepticism is reasonable. Although per-
ceptual functions are potentially multiply realizable, empirical research reveals
that they are implemented by relatively modular and localized neural struc-
tures, widely shared across individuals and species. In contrast, systems of
4
higher cognition are implemented by relatively flexible, distributed, and non-
modular neural structures. Thus, in the case of higher cognition, the pursuit
of project (ii) is jeopardized by multiple realizability and the lack of explana-
tory reductions. But, note, if (ii) is hopeless, (i) becomes pointless, for seeking
mind-brain correlations that do not contribute to an explanation of how neural
mechanisms compute cognitive functions becomes a mere vindication of token
physicalism. In short, from this perspective, project (ii) becomes unrealistic and
project (i), by itself, can hardly advance studies of higher cognition.4
Despite this bleak picture, it is undeniable that interdisciplinary fields at the
psycho-neural interface, such as neurolinguistics and neuroeconomics, have re-
cently achieved remarkable success, often by using neural-level data to advance
cognitive level theories.5 Neither reductive nor antireductive models can appro-
priately account for this. Still, these studies presuppose that it is possible to
map the cognitive level onto the neural level for, otherwise, how can neural data
be used to bear on cognitive-level theorizing? In order to account for the success
of these interdisciplinary studies, we need a novel account of bridge laws that
takes seriously their non-reductive character. To explore the nature of these
links, we shall focus on one of the main techniques which scientists use to make
neural data and theories bear on cognitive level hypotheses: reverse inference.
3 Bridge Laws and Reverse Inferences
In order to discriminate between competing cognitive hypotheses, neuroscien-
tists often ‘reverse infer’ the engagement of a cognitive state or process, in a
given task, from particular locations or patterns of brain activation (Henson
2005; Poldrack 2006; Del Pinal and Nathan 2013; Hutzler 2013; Machery 2013).
These reverse inferences presuppose the availability of bridge laws; yet, contrary
to a widespread assumption, the required links are not reductive, they are what
we call associative bridge laws. In this section, we examine the role of bridge
laws in two kinds of inferences employed in neuroimaging studies: location-
based and pattern-based reverse inferences. More specifically, we focus on stud-
ies of decision-making—a paradigmatic domain of higher-cognition—aimed at
discriminating between the processes which underlie behavioral generalizations.
To begin, consider the following psychological generalizations, somewhat
simplified for the sake of illustration, where s ranges over ‘normal’ adults:
4Those familiar with this debate will no doubt have seen various objections along these
lines. For instance, the picture of the psycho-neural interface assumed in the following quotes is
clearly constrained by (i) and (ii). “If the mind happens in space at all, it happens somewhere
north of the neck. What exactly turns on knowing how far north?” (Fodor 1999). “Finding
a cell that recognizes one’s grandmother does not tell you very much more than you started
with: after all, you know you can recognize your grandmother. What is needed is an answer
to how you, or a cell [...] does it” (Mayhew 1983, cited in Coltheart (2013)).
5To appreciate the magnitude of this growth, consider that in 2009, when the first canonical
textbook was published (Glimcher et al. 2009), courses and research on neuroeconomics were
regularly taught and pursued in just handful of economics and psychology departments. By
the time the second edition appeared, just four years later (Glimcher and Fehr 2014), over
one hundred institutions regularly taught and pursued research in neuroeconomics.
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(GM ) If s is faced with the option of performing an action a that will result in
the death of fewer people than would die if s were not to perform a, s will
choose a unless doing so requires using a person directly as a means.
(GN ) A set E contains some items that are new to s and others that s has
previously encountered. If s is randomly presented with item e ∈ E and
has to decide whether she has previously encountered e, s can reliably
distinguish between old and new items.
GM and GN can be refined in various ways, but neither is particularly original
nor controversial. Both capture distinctive capacities of higher-cognition which
are in need of explanation. We shall refer to the level at which we isolate these
types of psychological generalizations as Marr-level 1.6
Given a Marr-level 1 generalization, one can then explore the underlying
cognitive processes: such conjectures are usually referred to as Marr-level 2
hypotheses. First, consider two competing explanations of GM :
(M) In moral decision making, subjects generally follow consequentialist rules.
However, in cases which involve using another person directly as a means,
consequentialist rules are overridden by negative emotions.
(M∗) In moral decision making, subjects generally follow consequentialist rules.
However, in cases which involve using another person directly as a means,
consequentialist rules are overridden by deontological rules.
Note that M and M∗ are very different explanations of GM . Whereas M ex-
plains the behavioral pattern as a conflict between rules and emotions, M*
explains the same pattern as a conflict between consequentialist and deontolog-
ical rules. In short, while M posits a conflict between rules and emotions, M*
posits a conflict between different types of rules. Next, consider two competing
explanations of GN , recently advanced in episodic memory research:
(N) Recognition decisions are based on two processes which draw on two dis-
tinct sources of information: recollection of specific details and non-specific
feelings of familiarity. Recollection is used by default but, when such in-
formation is unavailable, subjects employ familiarity.
(N∗) Recognition decisions are based on two processes which draw on two dis-
tinct sources of information: recollection of specific details and non-specific
feelings of familiarity. However, neither is the default process: the source
of information employed depends on specific contextual cues.
6In an influential discussion, Marr (1982) argued that information-processing systems
should be investigated at three complementary levels. Hypotheses at Marr-level 1 pose the
computational problem: they state the task computed by the system. Hypotheses at Marr-
level-2 state the algorithm used to compute Marr-level 1 functions: they specify the basic
representations and operations of the system. Finally, hypotheses at Marr-level 3 specify how
Marr-level 2 algorithms are implemented in the brain: they purport to explain how these
basic representations and operations are realized at the neural level.
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While N and N∗ agree on the basic components underlying recognition deci-
sions, they posit different interactions. According to N , subjects generally use
recollection information to decide whether items are old, and only rely on in-
tuitions of familiarity when such information is unavailable. In contrast, N*
predicts that certain contextual cues will induce subjects to make familiarity-
based recognition decisions even if recollection information is available.
M -M∗ and N -N∗ are competing Marr-level 2 hypotheses about the cogni-
tive processes which underlie some Marr-level 1 generalization. To adjudicate
between them, researchers use reverse inferences, which require two preliminary
steps. First, the competing processes must be functionally decomposed, for en-
tire processes such as M and M* are too coarse-grained to be directly mapped
onto patterns or regions of neural activation. Next, the subcomponents of the
competing processes for which there are bridge laws must be identified. To
illustrate, let us assume that, in task T , cognitive process M posits the engage-
ment of subprocess m1, whereas M
∗ posits the engagement of subprocess m∗1,
and that m1 6= m∗1. Further, suppose that we have the following bridge laws
connecting m1 and m
∗
1 with regions or patterns of neural activation n1 and n
∗
1:
(A1) m1 ⊗ n1
(A2) m
∗
1 ⊗ n∗1
Note that ‘⊗’ is different from the ‘↔’ connective figuring in reductive bridge
laws. We shall discuss the basic properties of such relation in §4 below. The
important point here is simply that ‘⊗’ stands for an associative relation that
allows one to reliably infer the presence of one relata from the other.
To illustrate the application of statements such as A1 and A2, consider some
bridge laws used to discriminate between M and M∗. Assume that m1 stands
for processes involving negative emotions such as fear, and that m∗1 stands for
ruled-based processes such as following simple instructions. Researchers have es-
tablished a close connection between processes involving negative emotions and
activation in certain neural regions such as the amygdala and the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC).7 This connection is captured by A1. Researchers
have also established a connection between rule-based and controlled reasoning
and activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC).8 A2 captures this
connection by associating m∗1 with activation in the DLPFC.
7In general, the amygdala is critically involved in conditioned and unconditioned fear re-
sponse in animals, including humans. For example, patients with selective damage to the
amygdala show no physiological response to a previously fear-conditioned stimulus, although
they can explicitly remember the conditioning experience (Kandel et al. 2013, Ch. 48).
8Miller and Cohen (2001) present several studies that support the key role of the DLPFC
in cognitive control and rule-guided processes. A relevant set of experiments are based on the
famous Stroop task, in which subjects are instructed to name the color of the ink of words as
they appear on a screen. Famously, reaction times and error rates increase dramatically when
subjects read color-terms that differ from the color of their ink. Miller and Cohen present
imaging studies which show that, in the misleading cases, subjects who manage to follow the
correct rule and name the word’s ink color showed increased activation in DLPFC, compared
to subjects who fail the task.
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Given A1 and A2, one can devise neuroimaging experiments to discriminate
between M and M∗. For example, Greene and colleagues (2001) scanned sub-
jects making moral decisions in two sets of tasks that involve choosing whether
to sacrifice one innocent person to save five, as in the famous trolley problems.
The relevant difference is that in one set of tasks all the choices that would save
five people involve using another person directly as a means (personal cases),
whereas in the other set subjects can save five by sacrificing one indirectly,
that is, without using the person as a means (impersonal cases).9 Greene and
colleagues found that, relative to impersonal cases—and to structurally anal-
ogous non-moral control tasks—personal cases result in differential activation
of the amygdala and VMPFC, and less activation of DLPFC. Given that A1
associates amygdala activation with negative emotions, and that A2 associates
DLPFC activation with rule-based and controlled reasoning, this finding favors
M over M*. This is because, according to M , in personal cases, decisions not
to sacrifice one person to save five are based on negative emotions. In addition,
M predicts that areas involved in rule-based reasoning should be more active
in impersonal compared to personal cases. In contrast, M∗ incorrectly predicts
that personal and impersonal cases should engage rule-based areas equally, since
both cases involve applying different types of rules.
Critics of the relevance of neuroimaging experiments for psychology often
assume—more or less explicitly—that all bridge laws currently employed in
reverse inferences associate cognitive processes to locations of neural activation.
However, as we shall discuss below, this is a mistake: in some cases, the relevant
bridge laws map cognitive states or processes to particular patterns of neural
activation. Indeed, pattern-based inferences, which are rapidly becoming one of
the main ways of studying cognition, have significant implications for the psycho-
neural interface. A powerful example is provided by recent studies relevant to
the recognition hypotheses N and N∗, to which we now turn.
In pattern-based recognition studies, ‘pattern classifiers’ are trained to deter-
mine the multi-voxel patterns associated with recollection processes and famil-
iarity processes. Specifically, classifiers are trained in tasks where experimenters
can control which cognitive process is engaged. For instance, in one experiment,
which will serve as our main example, subjects were exposed to singular and
plural words such as ‘shoe’ and ‘shoes’ (Norman et al. 2009). These subjects
were then scanned while performing recognition tasks involving previously ex-
amined items (e.g., a shoe) and unrelated lures (e.g., a bicycle). The recognition
tasks are divided in two sets: recollection blocks and familiarity blocks. In rec-
ollection blocks, subjects are instructed to recall specific details of the mental
image formed during the study phase, and to only answer ‘yes’ if they are suc-
cessful. In contrast, in familiarity blocks subjects are instructed to answer ‘yes’
if the word is familiar and to ignore any details they might recollect from the
study phase. After training, classifiers can determine whether some multi-voxel
9In the classic version of the trolley problem, personal cases are exemplified by the ‘foot-
bridge’ scenario, where five people are saved by throwing a corpulent person on the track.
Impersonal cases are exemplified by the ‘switch’ scenario, where five people are saved by
pulling a lever that diverts the trolley onto a parallel track where it will kill a single person.
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pattern of neural activation is an instance of recollection or familiarity. What
makes this method especially interesting is that the reliability of the classifiers
can be established within the experiment itself. This can be done by saving a
subset of the recollection and familiarity blocks for later testing (so they are not
used at the training stage), and then determining the rate at which the classifier
correctly categorizes the corresponding neural patterns. This part of the study,
in which experimenters control which process is engaged, establishes the bridge
laws that will then be used in reverse inferences.
Having established the relevant bridge laws which map recollection and fa-
miliarity onto multi-voxel patterns, one can then test competing hypotheses N
and N* regarding the dynamics underlying recognition-decisions in cases where
the engagement of the sub-processes cannot be directly controlled. For example,
in a second phase of the study, subjects were scanned while trying to determine
whether some word is old or new, while being exposed to previously studied
items (‘shoe’ and ‘ball’), unrelated lures (‘horse’ and ‘box’), and previously un-
studied switch-plurality lures (‘balls’). Experimenters then examined the subset
of the items for which subjects made correct positive recognition decisions. Note
that these are cases where both recollection and familiarity information was
available to subjects. Hence, according to hypothesis N , the classifier should
categorize the corresponding voxel patterns as recollection patterns (since this
is the default). In contrast, N* predicts that the classification should be more
variable, involving—at least in some cases—familiarity patterns. Experimental
results support N∗ over N : when both types of information are available, var-
ious contextual cues determine whether subjects use familiarity or recollection
as the basis of their recognition decision (Norman et al. 2009).
4 Associative Bridge Laws
The previous examination of reverse inferences allowed us to place associative
bridge laws such as A1 and A2 in their context of use. The aim of this section
is to make explicit the characteristic features of these linking statements. As
we shall see, unlike their reductive counterparts, associative bridge laws are
probabilistic and context-sensitive relations that do not identify their relata,
either at the type-level or at the token-level.
4.1 Probabilities
The first main feature of associative bridge laws is their probabilistic nature.
To clarify, consider a recent debate about the ‘selectivity’ of brain regions and
reverse arguments. Several critics have emphasized that the success of a reverse
argument depends on the degree of selectivity of the relevant brain regions (Uttal
2002; Ross 2008; Phelps 2009; Anderson 2010; Coltheart 2013). Suppose that
some bridge law maps neural activation in n1 onto the engagement of cognitive
process m1. According to critics, this linkage allows one to legitimately reverse
infer the engagement of m1 from the activation of n1 only provided that region
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n1 activates for the cognitive process of interest, in this case n1, and no other.
This is because, the objection runs, if n1 also activates when m2, m3, and m4
are engaged, one cannot reverse infer to m1 merely on the neural evidence of n1
activation. The problem is that there is widespread consensus among cognitive
neuroscientists that very few brain regions are maximally selective in the sense
just described. From this perspective, then, it looks like most reverse inferences
are actually invalid, as they rely on an unjustified maximal selectivity.
This is a substantial worry that ought to be addressed with care. First, note
that while few brain regions are indeed maximally selective, most brain regions
are not mapped onto cognitive functions by a single bridge law. Most brain
regions are covered by multiple bridge laws which associate them with a variety
of cognitive functions. Consequently, when we reverse infer the engagement of
a cognitive function from the activation of a neural region, the inference falls
short of absolute certainty. Confidence that one has identified the correct bridge
law is a matter of degree, which is determined by the conditional probability
that cognitive process m1 is engaged, given activation in n1.
10 As an illustra-
tion, consider, again, the example of moral decision making. As neuroscientists
know, the amygdala is also activated by processes that are not related to neg-
ative emotions in any obvious way; consequently, amygdala activation does not
deductively entail the engagement of fear or similar emotions. However, it does
not follow that inferences from amygdala activation to the presence of negative
emotions are invalid; what follows is simply that such inferences are inductive
or probabilistic. The case of the amygdala is not the exception, it is the norm:
most brain regions are associated with various cognitive processes or states.
Furthermore, this point is not restricted to location-based inferences, but also
applies to pattern-based ones. The multi-voxel patterns are, at best, a reliable
guide for inferring (via bridge laws) the engagement of the associated cognitive
state or process.
With all of this in mind, we can now turn to an influential critique of the
probabilistic nature of reverse inferences. Several authors have argued that,
since the application of a given bridge law in some task is determined by a
conditional probability, most interesting reverse inferences turn out to be un-
acceptably weak (Miller 2008; Phelps 2009; Legrenzi and Umilta 2011). This
objection underlies many skeptical claims about the use of reverse inferences and
has led to the explicit suggestion that genuine progress at the psycho-neural in-
terface requires reductionist bridge laws (Ross 2008; Anderson 2010). No doubt,
in some cases, such accusations are justified: some proposed reverse inferences
10This conditional probability is determined by the following straightforward application of
Bayes’ theorem:
P (m1|n1) = P (n1|m1)P (m1)
P (n1|m1)P (m1) + P (n1|¬m1)P (¬m1)
(1)
Note that the prior P (m1) is conditioned on the task used in the reverse argument. Impor-
tantly, Equation (1) shows that the degree of belief in a reverse inference depends not only
the prior P (m1) but also on the selectivity of the neural response—i.e., on the ratio of the
process-specific activation, P (n1|m1), to the overall likelihood of activation in that area across
all tasks which do not involve m1, i.e., P (n1|¬m1).
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are indeed questionable, to say the least. Yet, this observation falls short of
a general critique, for the significance of the lack of (maximal) selectivity on
the validity of reverse inferences has been substantially exaggerated. This is
because critics often overlook another important characteristic of associative
bridge laws, namely, their context sensitivity.
4.2 Context-Sensitivity
In an influential article, Poldrack (2006) noted that the conditional probability
that a cognitive state m1 is associated to a neural state or process n1 should be
determined relative to a particular task. However, to avoid unnecessary com-
plications, Poldrack intentionally ignored this task-relativity in the rest of his
analysis. This deliberate omission, however, had the unfortunate consequence
that several ensuing discussions also ignored the task-relativity of bridge laws
in reverse inferences. This resulted in a misleading objection.
Consider the selectivity of the amygdala, which plays a central role in several
studies in neuroethics and neuroeconomics. Although the amygdala is typically
involved in processes involving fear and other negative emotions, it is also in-
volved in many other cognitive processes that are usually unmentioned in studies
such as Greene et al. (2001). Such processes include the perception of odor in-
tensity, sexually arousing stimuli, and trust from faces (Phelps 2006; Lindquist
et al. 2012), as well as the processing of faces from other races, and the per-
ception of biological motion and sharp contours (Phelps 2009). It has also been
claimed that the main function of the amygdala is to process novel or emo-
tionally salient stimuli—not fear-related stimuli per se (Lindquist et al. 2012).
Based on these considerations, Phelps (2009) argues that amygdala activation in
a given psychological task could signal the engagement of any of these cognitive
processes. Consequently, reverse inferences such as the ones used by Greene and
colleagues overestimate the conditional probability that negative emotions are
engaged, given amygdala activation.
What Phelps and other critics (e.g., Klein 2011) overlook is that the proba-
bility that a particular bridge law applies, given the activation of a brain region,
should be determined relative to relevant features of the context invoked by the
reverse argument. Specifically, in the case under consideration, the success of the
reverse argument does not depend on the assumption that we can reliably infer
the engagement of negative emotions from differential activation in the amyg-
dala. What the argument requires is that the engagement of negative emotions
can be inferred from the pattern of neural activation observed in the particular
task under consideration.11 In other words, the inference is from differential
amygdala-activation in personal scenarios to the engagement of negative emo-
tions. Once the inference is framed in these terms, we can see that most other
11For a discussion of task-relativity in reverse inferences, see Hutzler (2013) and Del Pinal
and Nathan (2013). In a related discussion, Machery (2013) defends the relativity of the
cognitive-level hypotheses being tested. Despite significant differences, here we can treat all
these approaches on a par, for they address the ‘lack of selectivity’ objection by emphasizing
the inherent relativity of reverse inferences.
11
cognitive processes that also involve the amygdala are not plausible explana-
tions for such differential activation, and can thus be ruled out. Consider, for
instance, the tasks used by Greene and colleagues (2001). Personal cases do
not differ from impersonal ones with respect to stimuli related to odor, facial-
processing, sexuality, sharp-contours, or the comparative novelty of the tasks.
Hence, relative to personal cases, the conditional probability of the engagement
of negative emotions, given amygdala activation, is significantly higher than is
suggested by the objection presented above.12
The critiques against reverse inference based on lack of selectivity—which are
typically raised against location-based inferences—become even less persuasive
when directed against pattern-based inferences. Yet, we should explicitly stress
that, just like location-based ones, pattern-based inferences are also context-
sensitive. For instance, the recognition experiments discussed in the previous
section employ bridge laws that associate particular multi-voxel patterns with
recollection and familiarity processes. In tasks that contrast recollection- and
familiarity-based recognition judgments, each set of multi-voxel patterns can be
used by a classifier to reliably identify instances in which recollection or famil-
iarity are engaged. However, these inferences are especially useful because, as
noted in §3, the reliability of the classifier can be established, directly and pre-
cisely, in an experimental setting. In general, pattern-based inferences are more
reliable than location-based ones; still, both are context-sensitive in essentially
the same way.
4.3 Non-Identity
Unlike their reductive counterparts, associative bridge laws do not presuppose
any kind of identity—a priori, a posteriori, necessary, or contingent. To wit, in
the moral decision making case, the bridge law mapping amygdala activation
to the engagement of negative emotions presupposes neither the type-identity
nor the token-identity of these two events. As we saw, the amygdala is differ-
entially activated by a variety of cognitive processes that have little or nothing
to do with negative emotions, and it might turn out that some unambiguously
fear-or-distress-related processes are not accompanied by increased amygdala
activation. We should make it very clear that we are not recommending any
departure from token-physicalism. Our point is simply that associative bridge
laws are so metaphysically uncommitted that they would also be consistent with
violations of token-physicalism.
A similar point applies to pattern-based inferences. Bridge laws used in
the recognition case do not presuppose that recollection or familiarity processes
are (type- or token-) identical to their associated multi-voxel patterns. For one
12We surmise that the task relativity of reverse inferences is systematically overlooked be-
cause methodological discussions (e.g., Poldrack 2006; Phelps 2006) often consider only arbi-
trary ‘empty’ tasks which do not eliminate any processing possibilities (that is, any bridge
laws) for the brain region of interest. Hence, reverse inferences seem intuitively weak. However,
once we consider the tasks relevant to each reverse inference, we can eliminate some subset of
bridge laws which cover the brain regions of interest, thereby increasing their strength.
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thing, the patterns are only highly reliable—but not infallible—indicators of
the corresponding processes. Furthermore, and more importantly, even if we
had perfect correlations, multi-voxel patterns are not plausible candidates for
such identities. Voxel patterns are representations that average over the activa-
tion of thousands of neurons, but do not specify the actual neural mechanisms
that compute cognitive-level processes. This, of course, is not to say that the
possibility of a type-identity can be ruled out a priori : one might believe that,
eventually, the neural mechanisms that carry out, say, recollection processes will
be identified. However, this reduction is neither required nor presupposed by
the use of pattern-based inferences to discriminate among competing hypotheses
of the processes underlying recognition tasks.
To appreciate the main features of associative bridge laws, it is useful to
contrast them with various recent attempts that deal with multiple realizability
by weakening Nagelian bridge laws. David Lewis (1969) famously argued that
reductive type-identities are not meant to hold across the board. On his view,
the bridge laws reducing mental states to brain states are implicitly restricted
to a specific domain. For example, while pain tout court cannot be reduced to a
single brain state, human pain, octopus pain, martian pain, etc. can each be re-
duced to a different type of brain state. Lewis’ argument has been subsequently
developed and refined by various philosophers (Hooker 1981; Enc¸ 1983; Church-
land 1986; Kim 1992) all of whom pointed out the conditional nature of virtually
all contingent event identities.13 Whether or not the context-relativization of
bridge laws is ultimately successful (which has been the subject of heated dis-
cussion), it is irrelevant to the present approach. Associative bridge laws do
not require restricted conditional identities of any kind. This is especially evi-
dent in the case of pattern-based inferences: the particular voxel patterns used
to infer the engagement of each sub-type of recognition process—that is, the
bridge laws—are not even stable across individuals, let alone all human beings,
and can only be used reliably in specific experimental contexts. In the experi-
ments considered above, the voxel patterns were used to infer the engagement
of familiarity or recollection in a task where these processes were the only un-
known variables. If a third task (say, a face-recognition process) were added,
the pattern-classifier would have to be re-trained. In this case, there would be
no guarantee that the patterns that were previously associated with familiarity
and recollection could still be used, in the new experimental settings, to reliably
predict those same processes.
For similar reasons, associative bridge laws should also be distinguished from
recent attempts to weaken Nagelian bridge laws by replacing type-identity with
a condition of connectability based on co-referentiality. Klein (2009) argues that
a higher-level science S is N -connectable to a lower-level science S′ if and only
if S′ has the resources to introduce new terms, in its own vocabulary, which
are co-referential with the predicates of S that are absent in S′. Determining
13To cite a textbook example, the standard identification of temperature with mean molec-
ular kinetic energy in classical equilibrium thermodynamics is left completely unscathed, the
arguments runs, by the observation that temperature is differently realized in gases, solids,
vacuums, and other mediums.
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the co-referentiality of terms is a substantial endeavor that, however, we can
set aside. The important point is that whether or not terms such as ‘amyg-
dala activation’ and ‘fear’ are co-referential—and there seems to be no reason
to assume that they are, given that one is often found without the other—is
irrelevant to our account, for the co-referentiality of terms is not a precondition
for their successful employment in reverse inferences.
In sum, the bridge laws which figure in location-and pattern-based reverse
arguments do not assume any kind of identity between neural and cognitive
states or processes. In order to play a role at the psycho-neural interface, as-
sociative bridge laws only need to allow us to reliably (reverse) infer, in certain
experimentally controlled settings, the engagement of a cognitive state or pro-
cess from particular locations or patterns of neural activation.
5 Implications
In the previous section, we analyzed the characteristic features of associative
bridge laws by drawing on the way they are employed in scientific practice and
contrasting them with their reductive counterparts. We now turn to their im-
plications for various ongoing debates about inter-level relations in philosophy
of mind and science. Specifically, we begin by discussing functional locationism
and multiple realizability. We conclude by revisiting the traditional intrerpre-
tation of Marr-levels and its relation to the alleged ‘automony’ of psychology.
5.1 Avoiding Radical Locationism
Many scholars, including prominent scientists and philosophers, argue that cog-
nitive neuroscientists assume an unreasonably strong version of functional loca-
tionism (Van Orden and Paap 1997; Fodor 1999; Uttal 2001; Coltheart 2013;
Satel and Lilienfeld 2013). Some have gone as far as labeling current cognitive
neuroscience the ‘new phrenology’ (Uttal 2002). This critique often presupposes
a reductive model of inter-level relations at the psycho-neural interface. To wit,
if one combines the assumptions that said links are reductive and that most
reverse inferences are still grounded in lesion studies and location-based neural
data, it becomes reasonable to conclude that cognitive neuropsychologists are in
the business of type-identifying cognitive functions with neural locations, bla-
tantly ignoring multiple realizability and the failures of derivational reduction.
While the charge of excessive functional locationism is sometimes warranted, it
does not apply to properly conducted reverse inferences (Del Pinal and Nathan
2013). Furthermore, it does not reflect the current trend in cognitive neuro-
science, at least if the increasing importance of pattern-based inferences is a
reliable indicator (Poldrack 2008, 2011).
As illustrated by our examples, most reverse arguments do not associate the
engagement of entire cognitive processes with specific locations of neural acti-
vation. The general strategy is to decompose the competing processes into their
subcomponents and to consider those subcomponents that can be mapped, via
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bridge laws, to neural locations or patterns, from which we can reliably reverse
infer the engagement of one of the cognitive processes, relative to a specific task.
In the moral case, only one of the competing processes predicted the engage-
ment of negative emotions in personal tasks, which is why differential amygdala-
activation provided evidence in favor of M over M*. The point to stress is that,
for the argument to go through, one need not assume the functional localiza-
tion of the entire moral decision-making processes. Pattern-based inferences are
even less plausible targets for the charge of unjustified functional locationism.
Classifiers use multi-voxel patterns to infer the engagement of recollection or
familiarity in particular recognition tasks. Note that classifiers are given no
location-related information, which allows for the set of patterns assigned to,
say, recollection to be implemented in different neural locations. Interestingly,
recent studies suggest that key components of recognition processes are, indeed
functionally localized (Norman et al. 2010). Yet the reverse inference does not
presuppose any link between neural patterns and locations of activation. To be
sure, there remain several controversial issues regarding the foundations of cog-
nitive neuropsychology, including the substantial question of how to formalize
the context- or hypothesis-relativity of reverse inferences (Del Pinal and Nathan
2013; Hutzler 2013; Machery 2013). Yet, the wholesale dismissal of the entire
cognitive neuropsychology of higher cognition as a ‘sophisticated new phrenol-
ogy in disguise’ does not withstand serious scrutiny.
5.2 Accommodating Multiple Realizability
As discussed in §2, the natural kinds of a ‘higher’ science cannot, in general, be
reduced to kinds of a ‘lower’ science because natural kinds seldom correspond
across domains in the way required by reductive bridge laws. A complete assess-
ment of multiple realizability and reduction lies beyond the scope of this article.
Our point is simply that multiple-realizability, coupled with a reductive concep-
tion of bridge laws, generates serious problems for understanding the fruitfulness
of the interdisciplinary work currently pursued in current neuroscience.
Associative bridge laws are perfectly consistent with the multiple-realizability
of psychological kinds. Amygdala activation signals the engagement of processes
involving negative emotions but, as discussed at length, it can also be triggered
by other cognitive processes, such as the perception of sharp contours and un-
usual stimuli. In addition, processes involving negative emotions could be im-
plemented in other neural locations. Still, as long as we can order these manifold
inter-level interactions in a probabilistic way, and provided that we factor in the
relevant task, neuroimaging data can be used in particular reverse arguments
to discriminate among competing higher-order cognitive hypotheses. Similarly,
pattern-based inferences are also compatible with multiple realizability, even in
its most radical forms. In the example presented above, multi-voxel patterns can
be used by classifiers to determine the engagement of recollection or familiarity-
based recognition processes. The patterns are extracted and the classifiers are
trained in specific tasks and for each subject individually. For instance, that
some multi-voxel pattern is accurately categorized as a recollection process by
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a classifier trained for a subject does not entail that the same pattern would be
so categorized by a classifier trained on a different subject. Likewise, the fact
that a classifier trained for a subject in a particular recollection/familiarity task
is reliable, does not mean that it would still reliably distinguish between these
processes in a different type of task—e.g., one that uses visual objects instead of
words. In short, the successful use of these multi-voxel patterns and classifiers
to discriminate between theories of the dynamics of recognition processes does
not depend on whether they are stable across subjects or even, within certain
limits, across tasks. Hence, the assumption that recollection and familiarity pro-
cesses are multiply realizable leaves the applicability of context-sensitive reverse
inferences completely unscathed.
5.3 Revisiting Marr-Levels and Reductionism
Let us conclude by discussing the third and most general implication of our
account. The classic reductive model of interlevel relations and Marr’s influ-
ential division of the study of cognition into three levels are, strictly speaking,
independent. Early eliminative materialists such as Paul Churchland (1981)
endorse reductionism while rejecting Marr-levels, whereas many philosophers
recognize the usefulness of Marr-levels but eschew reductionism (Bechtel and
Mundale 1999). However, the two views mutually support each other. To wit,
a standard reductionist response to multiple realizability is to argue that an-
tireductionists set up a straw man by selecting relata on the cognitive side that
are too coarse-grained to be reduced (Kim 1992; Shapiro 2000).14 The general
idea underlying this response is that, as cognitive functions are progressively
broken down into smaller subcomponents, it becomes more likely that we will
reach a level where (local) reductive bridge laws can be established. Note how
this picture of functional decompositions and local reductions fits in naturally
with a standard interpretation of Marr-levels, according to which it only makes
sense to ask about the lower-level implementation of functions once the cognitive
processes that compute them have been laid out in algorithmic detail.
We do not deny that hypotheses regarding the neural implementation of
cognitive-level processes constitute a significant portion of cognitive neuroscience.
Indeed, astonishing progress has been made in the study of how certain percep-
tual and motor functions are carried out in the brain. However, we believe that
this model of the psycho-neural interface as essentially addressing Marr-level 3
hypotheses is inadequate, as it leaves out much of the cognitive neuroscience
of higher cognition. On the reductive account of Marr-levels, psychology and
neuroscience only begin to meaningfully interact once we can ask how cognitive
processes are implemented in neural hardware. This ignores a different—but
14For instance, a cognitive function such as ‘language processing’ is too coarse-grained to be
directly associated to stable neural locations, as attempted by Poldrack (2006), to determine
the reliability of inferences from activation in certain regions of Broca’s area to the engagement
of language processing. Still, the appropriate relata might be found, the reductionist insists,
if we focus on subcomponents of language processes. For example, Pylkannen and colleagues
(2011) have attempted to find, with some success, the neural correlates of certain semantic
compositional operations, a key aspect of semantic processing.
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equally important—type of psycho-neural interaction: using neural data to se-
lect among competing cognitive processes even when we have no clue how they
could be neurally implemented (Del Pinal and Nathan 2013). This possibility
of delving into the neural level only to ‘come back up’ to select hypotheses at
the cognitive level is too often ignored by critics.
Our account of associative bridge laws also clarifies why, contrary to reduc-
tionist assumptions, it is often easier to employ neural data when Marr-level 2
hypotheses are not (yet) fully developed. For example, syntactic and seman-
tic theories in linguistics are quite refined, but neuroimaging studies have been
notoriously difficult to apply in this area. Linguists often face the task of deter-
mining whether a certain process is syntactic or semantic, with different models
yielding different predictions. Take the case of ‘it is raining,’ used to mean
that it is raining at the place of utterance. To account for this implicit loca-
tion restriction, some models assume that a syntactic variable is inserted in the
sentence prior to semantic interpretation (Stanley 2000); other models assume
that the meaning of ‘raining’ is enriched to include the specification of a location
(Recanati 2011). The former explanation appeals to a syntactic process; the lat-
ter to a semantic one. If we found bridge laws mapping syntactic and semantic
operations onto distinct locations or patterns of neural activation, we could try
to discriminate between the two models by scanning subjects while processing
such sentences. Unfortunately, establishing the relevant bridge laws is proving
to be a daunting task: since semantic and syntactic processes usually work in
tandem, they are extremely hard to disentangle. As a consequence, we can-
not, at present, use neural data to discriminate between syntactic and semantic
models of ellipsis. In contrast, models of moral and economic decision making
are still comparatively undeveloped. As Camerer and colleagues (2005) argue
in great detail, one of the main divisions in current studies of decision making is
between hypotheses that assume more rational processes, and hypotheses that
assume an essential involvement of emotions. This division is illustrated by our
discussion of moral decision making, and also emerges in several neuroeconomic
debates, such as in competing explanations of the endowment effect (Knutson
et al. 2008). This contrast is significant for the use of reverse inferences because
we have bridge laws that map emotions and controlled rule-guided behavior onto
distinct brain regions (Miller and Cohen 2001; Greene 2009). Consequently, we
can often test these decision-making hypotheses using reverse inference. How-
ever, as this branch of science progresses and mixed models that incorporate
both rational and emotional components become more common, it may become
more difficult to use our current bridge-laws to discriminate amongst them in
neuroimaging studies.
The occasional difficulty in finding bridge laws that discriminate between
advanced Marr-level 2 models—compared to the relative ease with which such
laws often discriminate more elementary models—is hard to reconcile with the
traditional reductive interpretation of Marr’s framework. Hypotheses that have
an advanced functional decomposition are better suited for implementation;
hence, from the reductive perspective, they should also be better candidates for
interaction and integration with the neural level. Furthermore, since few of our
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current hypotheses regarding capacities such as language or decision-making are
ready for Marr-level 3 implementation, it is hardly surprising that those who
accept the reductive interpretation of Marr levels typically endorse the rela-
tive autonomy of the psychology of higher cognition. In contrast, our dynamic
account makes better sense of the current limitations and achievements of in-
terdisciplinary research at the border of psychology and neuroscience. Once
again, our approach is compatible with the possibility that science will eventu-
ally discover the neural implementation of higher-level cognitive processes. Yet,
abandoning the reductive perspective suggests other significant ways in which
neural data can be employed to advance psychology.
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